미국 의회조사국(CRS)이 최근 한국에서 발생한 정치적 혼란에 대한 보고서를 23일 발표했다. 윤석열 대통령의 계엄령 선포와 탄핵 과정을 중심으로 작성된 이번 보고서는 한국 민주주의 체제와 한미 관계에 미칠 영향 등을 다각적으로 분석했다.
CRS에 따르면, 윤석열 대통령은 지난 12월 3일, “헌정 질서를 보호”한다며 계엄령을 선포하고 군 병력을 동원해 야당이 장악한 국회의 활동을 저지하려 했다. 그러나 국회는 즉각적으로 계엄령 철회를 요구하는 결의안을 만장일치로 통과시켰고, 윤 대통령은 몇 시간 뒤 계엄령을 철회했다.
이후 국회는 대통령 탄핵 절차를 개시했으며, 12월 14일 탄핵안이 가결되면서 윤 대통령은 직무가 정지됐다. 현재 헌법재판소가 탄핵의 적법성을 심리 중이며, 최종 결정이 한국 정치의 향방을 좌우할 것으로 CRS 보고서는 밝혔다.
한국 민주주의의 회복력
CRS는 비상계엄과 탁핵위기 속에서 한국 국회의 신속하고 합법적인 대응을 높이 평가했다. 계엄령에 대한 국회의 결의와 헌법재판소의 심리는 한국 민주주의 제도가 얼마나 강건한지를 보여주는 사례로 언급했다.
한미 관계에 미칠 영향
윤 대통령이 계엄령 선포 당시 주한미군 사령부와 협의 없이 군 병력을 동원한 점과 관련, 한미 동맹 조율에 대한 우려를 제기했다. CRS는 이러한 조치가 한미 간 외교적, 군사적 협력에 부정적인 영향을 미칠 수 있다고 경고했다.
외교 정책의 변화 가능성
윤 대통령의 강경한 대북 및 대중 정책은 야당이 집권할 경우 유화적인 방향으로 전환될 가능성이 있다고 내다봤다. CRS는 이러한 변화가 인도-태평양 전략에서의 미국의 통일된 노력을 약화시킬 수 있다고 전망했다.
지정학적 파장 우려
CRS는 이번 위기가 반도체 외교와 방위비 분담 협정 등 한국의 주요 외교정책 추진력을 약화시킬 수 있다고 분석했다. 또한, 정치적 불안정이 지속된다면 한국의 지역 및 글로벌 영향력이 축소될 위험도 있다고 평가했다.
보고서는 또 이번 정치적 불안이 한국의 주요 외교 정책에도 영향을 미칠 수 있다고 경고했다. 특히 반도체 산업 외교, 방위비 분담 협상 등 중요한 협력 과제가 정치적 불안정으로 인해 약화될 수 있다는 점 등을 지적했다.
CRS는 한국의 민주주의 체제가 이번 위기를 극복하는 과정에서 다시 한번 그 회복력을 증명할 것으로 기대하고 있다. 동시에, 헌법재판소의 결정이 한국과 동아시아 지역의 정치적 안정에 중요한 변곡점이 될 것이라고 강조했다.
현재 윤 대통령의 탄핵 심리는 진행 중이며, 최종 판결은 최대 180일 이내에 나올 예정이다. 미국 CRS는 한국이 이번 위기를 통해 민주주의와 국제적 신뢰를 동시에 강화할 수 있을지에 주목하고 있다.
CRS는 미국 의회가 국제적 위기에 대한 전략적 결정을 내릴 수 있도록 비판적 사고와 다각적 분석을 제공하고 있다.
South Korean Political Crisis: Martial Law and Impeachment
December 23, 2024
In December 2024, South Korea plunged into a political crisis that could have significant implications for
U.S. interests, including U.S. policies toward North Korea, China, Japan, and Russia. At around 10:30
p.m. on December 3, after months of escalating tension and political gridlock between the executive and
the opposition-controlled National Assembly (Figure 1), President Yoon Suk-Yeol declared martial law
“to protect the constitutional order” from the left-of-center opposition party, the Democratic Party (DP),
and its allies. Yoon has described these opposition parties as pro-North Korean “anti-state forces.” Yoon
dispatched military and police forces to the National Assembly complex to prevent it from convening and
reportedly to arrest party leaders. Most legislators—some of whom came of age protesting against South
Korea’s military government in the 1970s and 1980s—managed to evade or break through the security
cordon.
Figure 1. Party Strength in the National Assembly
Source: Republic of Korea National Assembly.
At 1:00am on December 4, the National Assembly voted 190-0 to demand Yoon rescind his order. (South
Korean law empowers the National Assembly to override a martial law decree.) Shortly before 4:30am,
Yoon lifted martial law. (Figure 2.)
On December 4, opposition parties jointly filed a motion of impeachment against Yoon and key members
of his government. A December 7 vote narrowly failed, with almost all of Yoon’s People Power Party
(PPP) representatives boycotting the proceedings. A second vote on December 14 succeeded, with 12
PPP representatives voting in favor. Factors influencing PPP members’ shift appear to have been Yoon’s
public defiance and polls indicating Yoon’s approval ratings—which had been in the 20%-30% range for
most of his tenure—had dipped below the teens. Over 70% of Koreans polled supported impeachment,
and tens of thousands of protestors, as well as many civil society groups, mobilized in support of
impeachment. Following his impeachment, Yoon was suspended from office and Prime Minister Han
Duk-soo became Acting President.
Next Steps
Yoon’s impeachment goes to South Korea’s Constitutional Court for a trial, which must be decided within
180 days. If the Court upholds the impeachment, as it did with President Park Geun-hye in 2017, Yoon
will be ousted from office and elections must be held within 60 days. If the Court overturns the
impeachment, as it did with President Roh Moo-hyun in 2004, Yoon will be reinstated and the next
presidential election will be slated for its regularly scheduled date in March 2027. (By law, South Korean
presidents serve one five-year term.) Park and Roh’s verdicts were returned within 63 days and 92 days,
respectively. Separately, Yoon is under criminal investigation for insurrection, a charge that supersedes the
president’s usual immunity from prosecution.
The timing of the Court’s verdict could be important because the presumed front-runner for an early
election, the DP’s leader Lee Jae-myung, is facing multiple court proceedings in which guilty verdicts
could render him ineligible for political office. Lee, who lost the 2022 presidential election to Yoon by
0.7% of the vote, is accused of corruption, violating election laws, and involvement in an illegal cash
transfer to North Korea, among other charges. He is appealing a November 2024 election law conviction
that bars him from running for office.
U.S. Government Response
As shown in Figure 2, during the six hours martial law was in place and in the aftermath of its lifting,
Biden Administration officials expressed “concern” at Yoon’s martial declaration. They also stated their
expectation that political disputes would be resolved peacefully and lawfully, sentiments some Members
of Congress echoed. Some Members criticized Yoon’s martial law declaration directly. The Defense
Department cancelled scheduled bilateral meetings. Following Yoon’s impeachment, President Joe Biden
spoke with Acting President Han to express “his appreciation for the resiliency of democracy and the rule
of law” in South Korea.
Geostrategic Implications
Since assuming office in 2022, Yoon has brought South Korea into closer alignment with the United
States on North Korea, China, Japan, and Ukraine. The DP, whose approval rating now tops the PPP’s by
double-digits in some polls, tends to advocate starkly different policies. The Assembly’s first
impeachment motion, for instance, accused Yoon of “neglect[ing]” geopolitical balance by “antagonizing”
North Korea, China, and Russia and by pursuing a “strange Japan-centered” foreign policy. DP Leader
Lee reportedly said including those items had been a mistake, and they were not included in the second
impeachment motion.
A question facing U.S. policymakers and Congress is whether Yoon’s deployment of the Republic of
Korea (ROK, or South Korea) military to implement martial law, without notifying U.S. military commanders in Korea, poses concerns about the state of alliance coordination. Additionally, the fallout
from Yoon’s moves may have compromised the PPP government’s ability to engage in major foreign
policy initiatives. Under an interim president, Seoul may be at a disadvantage in advocating for its
positions if the next U.S. Administration pursues changes that would affect U.S.-ROK relations, including
on tariffs, the size of U.S. troop deployments to South Korea, policy toward semiconductors and other
technology sectors, and/or modifying or withdrawing from the U.S.-ROK burden-sharing agreement that
was finalized in November 2024.
Similarly, Yoon’s suspension and possible removal from office raises questions about the staying
power of a number of foreign policies he has pursued, including
-A relative hardline policy toward North Korea that treats North Korea as an existential
threat and emphasizes deterrence. In contrast, South Korean progressives tend to
emphasize engagement policies.
-Integrating South Korea into the U.S.-led network of alliances and partnerships in the
Indo-Pacific, with a goal of making South Korea a “global pivotal state,” including by
championing democratic values. Many South Korean progressives have criticized Yoon’s
policy.
-A greater willingness than prior ROK leaders to publicly criticize China’s actions. DP
Leader Lee has questioned this approach.
-Improving relations with Japan and expanding ROK-U.S.-Japan relations, which have been centerpieces of Yoon’s foreign policy, an approach involving compromises on historical issues with Japan that Lee has characterized as “shameful.”
Author Information
Mark E. Manyin
Specialist in Asian Affairs